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Abstract
We introduce the “relative diffuseness” assumption to characterize the dif-
ferences between payoff-relevant and strategy-relevant diffuseness of information.
Based on this assumption, the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with
incomplete information and general action spaces can be obtained. Moreover, we
introduce a new notion of “undistinguishable purification” which strengthens the
standard purification concept, and its existence follows from the relative diffuse-
ness assumption.
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2
1 Introduction
Since Harsanyi (1967–68), games with incomplete information have been widely
studied and found applications in many fields. Various kinds of hypotheses are
proposed on the formulation of such games to guarantee the existence of pure strat-
egy equilibria.1 In particular, if players’ information is diffuse,2 positive results
have been obtained when all players’ action spaces are finite and the information
structure is disparate; see Radner and Rosenthal (1982). These results lead to
a natural conjecture on the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with
incomplete information and general action spaces; for example, see Theorem 6.2
of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). Unfortunately, this existence result fails to hold
with the general action spaces; see Khan et al. (1999).
The main aim of this paper is to consider the existence of pure strategy equi-
libria for games with incomplete information and general action spaces. Towards
this end, we shall distinguish different roles of the diffuseness of information. In
games with incomplete information, the private information will influence games
from two aspects: payoffs and strategies. In the conventional approach, the dif-
ferent diffuseness of information on these two aspects is usually considered from
a unified point of view. However, when making decisions, the player’s strategy-
relevant diffuseness of information could be much richer than that conveyed in the
payoff function.3
Therefore, we suggest to describe the strategy-relevant and payoff-relevant dif-
fuseness of information separately. The relation between these two kinds of diffuse-
ness is characterized by the “relative diffuseness” assumption, which basically says
that the strategy-relevant diffuseness is essentially richer than the payoff-relevant
diffuseness on any nonnegligible information subset. Based on this assumption,
we are able to prove the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with incom-
plete information and general action spaces without invoking any existence result
of mixed strategy equilibria.
To obtain the existence of pure strategy equilibria, the purification method is
another powerful tool originated from Dvoretsky et al. (1951). In the case of finite
actions, the purification method ensures that every mixed strategy equilibrium has
1The increasing literature has widened significantly in recent years, as evidenced by Athey (2001),
Araujo and de Castro (2009), Reny (2011), etc.
2The information is said to be diffuse if every private information space is atomless.
3A player may have richer diffuseness of information when making decisions: from a realistic point
of view, she can access to more information via communication, learning, etc; from a technical point of
view, to guarantee the measurability of her payoff function, one may only need a sub-σ-algebra.
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a payoff equivalent pure strategy equilibrium when the private information is dif-
fuse; see, for example, Radner and Rosenthal (1982), Milgrom and Weber (1985)
and Khan et al. (2006). Since the existence of mixed strategy equilibria has been
established with great generality (see, for example, Milgrom and Weber (1985)
and Fu (2008)), a pure strategy equilibrium automatically exists. However, the
above results strictly depend on the assumptions on action spaces (finite or count-
able). To obtain the purification results for general action spaces, the underlying
information spaces have to be sufficiently rich; see Loeb and Sun (2006) for Loeb
spaces.
A pure strategy profile is said to be a purification of a mixed strategy profile
if the expected payoffs/distributions of these two strategy profiles are the same
for all players. However, when a player restricts her attention to a payoff-relevant
information subset, this payoff equivalence may be not valid. In this paper we will
introduce the notion of “undistinguishable purification” which retains the pay-
off/distribution equivalence universally on any payoff-relevant information subset
for each player. Based on the relative diffuseness assumption, we will show that an
undistinguishable purification exists for any mixed strategy profile. Consequently,
the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with incomplete information and
general action spaces can be also obtained.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setup of
games with incomplete information, and the key assumption—relative diffuseness
is introduced in Section 3. In Section 4, we prove the existence of pure strategy
equilibria for general action spaces. The notion of undistinguishable purification
is introduced and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper and the
proof of Theorem 1 is collected in Section 7.
2 Games with incomplete information
Games with incomplete information (henceforth games for short) can be described
as follows. Each player i observes an informational type ti, whose values lie in some
measurable space (Ti,Ti). After observing the type, player i selects an action ai
from some compact metric space Ai of feasible actions. We allow each player’s
payoff to depend on the actions chosen by all the players, and on her type as well.
We define an information structure λ for the game which is a joint probability on
T1 × T2 × · · · × Tn.
To be precise, a game with incomplete information Γ consists of five formal
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elements.
• The set of players: I = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
• The set of actions available to each player: {Ai}i∈I . Each Ai is a compact
metric space. Let A = ×ni=1Ai denote the space of action profiles.
• The (private) information space for each player: {Ti}i∈I . Each Ti is endowed
with a σ-algebra Ti. Let T = ×
n
i=1Ti and T = ⊗
n
i=1Ti.
• The payoff functions: {ui}i∈I . Each ui is a mapping from A× Ti to R.
• The information structure: λ, a probability measure on the measurable space
(T,T ).
For payoff functions, we have the following standard assumption. Conditions
(1) and (2) describe the measurability and continuity respectively, and Condi-
tion (3) states an integrably bounded restriction.
Assumption (P). For each i ∈ I, the payoff function ui satisfies the following
requirements:
(1) ui is B(A)⊗ Ti-measurable on A× Ti, where B(A) is the Borel σ-algebra of
A.
(2) ui(·, ti) is continuous on A for all ti ∈ Ti.
(3) There is a real-valued integrable function hi on (Ti,Ti, λi), such that |ui| ≤ hi
on A× Ti.
For each i ∈ I, associated with the information structure λ is a marginal
probability on each Ti which we denote by λi. For these probabilities, we have the
following assumption of independence.
Assumption (I). The private information of each player is independent of all
other players’ private information, i.e., λ = ⊗ni=1λi.
This assumption can be weakened and correlations of information are allowed.4
We adopt this basic setup for the sake of simplicity.
For each player i ∈ I, a mixed strategy (resp. pure strategy) is a measurable
function from Ti to M(Ai) (resp. Ai). The set of all mixed strategies (resp. pure
strategies) of player i is denoted by LTi0
(
Ti,M(Ai)
)
(resp. LTi0 (Ti, Ai)). A pure
strategy can be viewed as a mixed strategy by taking it as a Dirac measure for
4For detailed discussions, see Section 6.
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almost every ti. As usual, we write t−i for an information profile of all players
other than i, and T−i for the space of all such information profiles. We adopt
similar notations for action profiles and strategy profiles.
Given a strategy profile f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn) and a subset E ∈ Ti, the expected
payoff of player i on the event E is
UEi (f) =
∫
E×(×j 6=iTj)
∫
A
ui(a1, . . . , an, ti) ·
∏
j∈I
fj(tj,daj) dλ(t).
Taking E = Ti, U
Ti
i (f) is exactly the expected payoff of player i, which is denoted
by Ui(f) for simplicity.
Given a strategy profile f , let
V
f
i (ai, ti) =
∫
×j 6=iTj
∫
A−i
ui(a1, . . . , an, ti) ·
∏
j 6=i
fj(tj ,daj) ·
∏
j 6=i
dλj(tj),
then UEi (f) =
∫
E
∫
Ai
V
f
i (ai, ti)fi(ti,dai) dλi(ti) for any subset E ∈ Ti.
A mixed (resp. pure) strategy equilibrium is a mixed (resp. pure) strategy
profile f∗ = (f∗1 , f
∗
2 , . . . , f
∗
n) such that f
∗
i maximizes Ui(fi, f
∗
−i) in L
Ti
0
(
Ti,M(Ai)
)
(resp. LTi0 (Ti, Ai)) for each i ∈ I.
3 Relative diffuseness of information
In this section, we will propose the “relative diffuseness” assumption as a charac-
terization of the relation between two kinds of diffuseness of information.
For each i ∈ I, let (Ti,Ti, λi) be an atomless probability space with a complete
countably-additive probability measure λi. Let Fi be a sub-σ-algebra of Ti. The
σ-algebras Ti and Fi will represent the diffuseness of information from the aspect
of strategies and from the aspect of payoffs respectively.5 The probability spaces
(Ti,Ti, λi) and (Ti,Fi, λi) will be used to model the information space and the
payoff-relevant information space respectively.
For any nonnegligible subsetD ∈ Ti, the restricted probability space (D,F
D
i , λ
D
i )
is defined as follows: FDi is the σ-algebra {D∩D
′ : D′ ∈ Fi} and λ
D
i the probabil-
ity measure re-scaled from the restriction of λi to F
D
i . Furthermore, (D,T
D
i , λ
D
i )
can be defined similarly.
5Fi could be regarded as the sub-σ-algebra generated by the payoff ui, in the sense that Fi is the
smallest σ-algebra which can guarantee the measurability of ui.
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Now we are ready to present the condition of nowhere equivalence.6
Definition 1. Following the notations above, Ti is said to be nowhere equivalent
to Fi if for every D ∈ Ti with λi(D) > 0, there exists a Ti-measurable subset D0
of D such that λi(D0△D1) > 0 for any D1 ∈ F
D
i .
The following statement is clear: if (Ti,Ti, λi) is atomless and the sub-σ-algebra
Fi is purely atomic, then Ti is nowhere equivalent to Fi.
7
We shall introduce the assumption of relative diffuseness as follows.
Assumption (RD). For each i ∈ I, Ti is atomless and nowhere equivalent to Fi.
This assumption implies that on any nonnegligible set D ⊆ Ti, T
D
i is always
essentially larger than FDi , which means that the strategy-relevant diffuseness of
information is richer.
4 Existence of pure strategy equilibria
In this section, we turn to the issue of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in
games with incomplete information and general action spaces. First, we need to
modify Assumption (P) to make the statement consistent.
Assumption (P’). For each i ∈ I, suppose that Fi is a countably-generated sub-
σ-algebra of Ti.
8 The payoff function ui satisfies the following requirements:
(1) ui is B(A)⊗Fi-measurable on A× Ti, where B(A) is the Borel σ-algebra of
A.
(2) ui(·, ti) is continuous on A for all ti ∈ Ti.
(3) There is a real-valued integrable function hi on (Ti,Fi, λi), such that |ui| ≤ hi
on A× Ti.
The theorem on the existence of pure strategy equilibria is presented below.
We will provide a direct proof in the Section 7 without invoking any results of
6The condition of nowhere equivalence is introduced in He et al. (2013). Proposition 1 there presents
several equivalent statements of this condition.
7Lemma 1 in He et al. (2013) shows that for any atomless measure space, there always exists an
atomless sub-σ-algebra, to which the original σ-algebra is nowhere equivalent.
8It is natural to assume “countably-generated” condition. Since the range of ui is R endowed with the
Borel σ-algebra, the restricted σ-algebra on Ti which is induced by ui is obviously countably generated.
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mixed/behavioral strategies.9
Theorem 1. In a game with incomplete information Γ, the action space Ai is
uncountable for each i ∈ I. If Assumptions (P’), (I) and (RD) hold, then there
exists a pure strategy equilibrium.
There is a substantial literature on the existence of pure-strategy equilibria
with general action spaces and more structures on the information space, e.g.,
Loeb spaces (see Khan and Sun (1999)) and saturated probability spaces (see
Khan and Zhang (2012)). Among these conditions, the information spaces cannot
contain any countably-generated part. Our result is more general in the sense that
any atomless probability information space is allowed.
Remark 1. Since an atomless probability space is saturated if and only if it is
nowhere equivalent to any countably generated sub-σ-algebra (see He et al. (2013)),
the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with general action spaces and
saturated information spaces is straightforward based on Theorem 1.
5 Undistinguishable purification
In this section, several equivalence conditions for strategy profiles will be discussed.
We shall introduce the notion of undistinguishable purification which refines the
standard purification concept and prove its existence based on the relative diffuse-
ness assumption. Then the existence of pure strategy equilibria follows directly.
5.1 Universal equivalences
In this subsection, we will propose the notions of “universal payoff/distribution
equivalence” by requiring that each player cannot distinguish the expected pay-
offs/distributions on any payoff-relevant information subset.
Definition 2. Let f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn) and g = (g1, g2, . . . , gn) be two mixed strat-
egy profiles.
1. For player i, the strategy profiles f and g are said to be distribution equivalent
on the event E ∈ Fi if
∫
E
fi(ti, ·) dλi(ti) =
∫
E
gi(ti, ·) dλi(ti). The strategy
9There are some discussions in the literature on the limitations and relations of mixed and behavioral
strategies; see Radner and Rosenthal (1982) and Milgrom and Weber (1985). Our proof is free from
these issues.
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profiles f and g are said to be universally distribution equivalent if for each
player i ∈ I,
∫
E
fi(ti, ·) dλi(ti) =
∫
E
gi(ti, ·) dλi(ti)
10 on every event E ∈ Fi.
2. For player i, the strategy profiles f and g are said to be payoff equivalent on
the event E ∈ Fi if U
E
i (f) = U
E
i (g). The strategy profiles f and g are said
to be universally payoff equivalent if for each player i ∈ I, UEi (f) = U
E
i (g)
on every event E ∈ Fi.
3. Suppose that f is a pure strategy profile. For player i, fi is said to be belief
consistent with gi if fi(ti) ∈ supp gi(ti) for λi-almost all ti ∈ Ti. Moreover,
f is said to be belief consistent with g if they are belief consistent for each
player i ∈ I.
The following result is clear, and its proof is given for completeness.
Lemma 1. Suppose that (I,I, η) is an atomless probability space, L is a countably
generated sub-σ-algebra of I, and X is a Polish space. For any two I-measurable
measure valued mappings h1 and h2 from I to M(X), if for any event D ∈ L,
∫
D
h1(i, ·) dη(i) =
∫
D
h2(i, ·) dη(i),
then ∫
D
∫
X
ψ(i, x)h1(i,dx) dη(i) =
∫
D
∫
X
ψ(i, x)h2(i,dx) dη(i)
for any L ⊗ B(X)-measurable integrably bounded mapping ψ.11
Proof. For any D ∈ F and any Borel subset B ⊆ X, we have
∫
I
∫
X
1D(i)1B(x)h1(i,dx) dη(i) =
∫
I
∫
X
1D(i)1B(x)h2(i,dx) dη(i).
Fix an L⊗ B(X)-measurable integrably bounded mapping ψ. Without loss of
generality, we assume that it is nonnegative. Then ψ is an increasing limit of a
sequence of simple functions. Thus,
∫
D
∫
X
ψ(i, x)h1(i,dx) dη(i) =
∫
D
∫
X
ψ(i, x)h2(i,dx) dη(i)
by the monotone convergence theorem.
10When fi is a pure strategy,
∫
E
fi(ti, B) dλi(ti) = λi
(
E ∩ f−1
i
(B)
)
for any Borel subset B ⊆ Ai.
11An L ⊗ B(X)-measurable mapping ψ is said to be integrably bounded if |ψ(i, x)| ≤ φ(i) on X for
some real-valued integrable function φ on (I,L, η).
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The following proposition shows that the universal payoff equivalence can be
deduced by the universal distribution equivalence.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumptions (I) and (P’) hold. If mixed strategy
profiles f and g are universally distribution equivalent, then they are universally
payoff equivalent.
Proof. Fix player i ∈ I. Given any E ∈ Fi, it suffices to show U
E
i (f) = U
E
i (g).
First, we have
V
g
i (ai, ti) =
∫
A−i
∫
×j 6=iTj
ui(a1, . . . , an, ti) ·
∏
j 6=i
gj(tj,daj) ·
∏
j 6=i
dλj(tj)
=
∫
A−i
ui(a1, . . . , an, ti) ·
∏
j 6=i
µ
gj
j (daj),
where µ
gj
j =
∫
Tj
gj(tj , ·)λj(tj). Since f and g are universally distribution equiva-
lent, µ
fj
j = µ
gj
j for each j 6= i, which implies that V
f
i (ai, ti) = V
g
i (ai, ti) for any
ai ∈ Ai and ti ∈ Ti.
Since f and g are universally distribution equivalent, for any D ∈ Fi and any
Borel subset B ⊆ Ai, we have
∫
Ti
∫
Ai
1D(ti)1B(ai)fi(ti,dai) dλi(ti) =
∫
Ti
∫
Ai
1D(ti)1B(ai)gi(ti,dai) dλi(ti).
Thus, by Lemma 1 we have
UEi (f) =
∫
E
∫
Ai
V
f
i (ai, ti)fi(ti,dai) dλi(ti)
=
∫
E
∫
Ai
V
g
i (ai, ti)gi(ti,dai) dλi(ti) = U
E
i (g).
The proof completes.
5.2 Undistinguishable purification
In this subsection, we will introduce the notion of “undistinguishable purification”
and prove its existence. Furthermore, based on the existence results of mixed
strategy equilibria, the existence of pure strategy equilibria for general action
spaces can be obtained by the purification method.
The following fact is shown in Lemma 4.4(iii) of Hoover and Keisler (1984).
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Fact 1. Suppose that (I,I, η) is an atomless probability space, L is a countably
generated sub-σ-algebra of I, and X is a Polish space. If I is nowhere equivalent
to L,12 then for any L-measurable mapping h1 from I to M(X), there exists an I-
measurable mapping h2 from I to X, such that
∫
D
h1(i, ·) dη(i) =
∫
D
h2(i, ·) dη(i)
for any event D ∈ L.
In the following we will present a general purification result, which is beyond
the framework of games with incomplete information. The proof follows from
Fact 1 and Lemma 1.
Proposition 2. Under the conditions of Fact 1, for any L-measurable mapping
h1 from I to M(X), there exists an I-measurable mapping h2 from I to X, such
that ∫
D
h1(i, ·) dη(i) =
∫
D
h2(i, ·) dη(i)
for any event D ∈ L, and
∫
D
∫
X
ψ(i, x)h1(i,dx) dη(i) =
∫
D
ψ(i, h2(i)) dη(i)
for any L ⊗ B(X)-measurable integrably bounded mapping ψ.
Remark 2. In the literature, the purification result is always stated as follow:
given a measure-valued mapping from I toM(X) and at most countably many joint
measurable integrably bounded functions from I×X to R, there exists a measurable
mapping from I to X which yields the same expected payoffs/distributions.13
Proposition 2 generalizes this result by showing that one can find a measurable
mapping from I to X which has the same expected payoffs/distributions for any
joint measurable integrably bounded function from I ×X to R and on any payoff-
relevant subset.
Now we are ready to give the definitions of purification and undistinguishable
purification.
Definition 3. Suppose that f is a pure strategy profile and g is a mixed strategy
profile.
1. The pure strategy profile f is said to be a purification of g if they are dis-
tribution equivalent and payoff equivalent on Ti for each i ∈ I, and belief
consistent.
12In Lemma 4.4(iii) of Hoover and Keisler (1984), I is assumed to be conditional atomless over L,
which is equivalent to our condition; for detailed discussions, see He et al. (2013).
13See, for example, Dvoretsky et al. (1951) and Khan et al. (2006).
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2. The pure strategy profile f is said to be an undistinguishable purification of g
if they are universally distribution equivalent, universally payoff equivalent,
and belief consistent.
The first definition is standard, and the latter one strengthens the first one
by requiring that the expected payoffs/distributions are the same on any payoff-
relevant information subset.
In Dvoretsky et al. (1951) and Khan et al. (2006), the payoff equivalence, dis-
tribution equivalence and belief consistence are stated separately. In Proposition 1
we have proven that the universal distribution equivalence implies the universal
payoff equivalence, and in the following we will show that the belief consistence
is also implied by the universal distribution equivalence. Therefore, the notion of
undistinguishable purification can be simplified such that it only depends on the
universal distribution equivalence.
Proposition 3. If a T -measurable pure strategy f is universally distribution equiv-
alent to an F-measurable mixed strategy g, then f is belief consistent with g.
Proof. Fix player i. Define a mapping c from Ti×Ai to R as c(ti, ai) = 1supp gi(ti)(ai).
Then c is Fi ⊗ B(Ai)-measurable.
14 Since f and g are universally distribution
equivalent, by Lemma 1 we have
∫
Ti
c(ti, fi(ti)) dλi(ti) =
∫
Ti
∫
Ai
c(ti, ai)gi(ti,dai) dλi(ti) = 1.
Therefore, c(ti, fi(ti)) = 1 for λi-almost all ti ∈ Ti, which implies that fi(ti) ∈
supp gi(ti) for λi-almost all ti ∈ Ti.
It follows from Fact 1 that any F-measurable mixed strategy profile15 has a
universally distribution equivalent T -measurable pure strategy profile. Thus, the
existence of undistinguishable purifications is due to Propositions 1, 3 and Fact 1.
Theorem 2. Suppose that Assumptions (P’), (I) and (RD) hold. Then every
F-measurable mixed strategy profile has a T -measurable undistinguishable purifi-
cation.
Remark 3. The extensions of the standard purification result as in Dvoretsky et al.
(1951) and Khan et al. (2006) to the general action spaces is clear in our setup.
14This measurability is implied by the measurability of the correspondence supp gi(ti).
15By F -measurable strategy profile g, we mean that gi is Fi-measurable for each i; similar interpre-
tation applies for the T -measurable strategy profile f .
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Moreover, since an atomless probability space is saturated if and only if it is
nowhere equivalent to any countably generated sub-σ-algebra, the corresponding
purification consequences with saturated probability spaces also follow from our
result.
The existence of mixed strategy equilibria has been established with great
generality; see, for example, Milgrom and Weber (1985) and Fu (2008). Thus, an
undistinguishable purification can be obtained by Theorem 2 and easily shown to
be a pure strategy equilibrium.
6 Concluding remarks
In the current paper, we propose the relative diffuseness assumption to charac-
terize the differences between payoff-relevant and strategy-relevant diffuseness of
information. Based on this assumption, the existence of pure strategy equilib-
ria in games with incomplete information and general action spaces is obtained.
Moreover, we introduce the notion of undistinguishable purification and show its
existence.
The model discussed in this paper is simple as the prior is assumed to be
independent across all players’ private information spaces. The relative diffuseness
assumption can be used to deal with more general formulations. For example, we
can introduce a new type of information which is payoff-relevant for all players.
To be clear, suppose that T0 = {t
1
0, t
2
0, . . . , t
m
0 } represents the space of common
information and T0 the power set of T0; see Milgrom and Weber (1985). For each
i ∈ I, player i’s payoff function ui will depend on the action profile, her own
type, and the realized common information. The information structure λ will be
a probability on
(
T0× (×
n
i=1Ti),T0⊗ (⊗
n
i=1Ti)
)
. We need the following conditional
independence assumption: for each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, λj = ⊗ni=1λ
j
i , where λ
j is the
conditional probability measure on the product measurable space (×ni=1Ti,⊗
n
i=1Ti)
when the common information is tj0, and λ
j
i is the marginal probability measure
of λj on (Ti,Ti) for each i ∈ I. Then Assumption (RD) will be restated under
the probability measure λji for each i and j. With the conditional independence
assumption, (P’) and (RD), it can be easily checked that the main results on
purification and existence of a pure strategy equilibrium still hold following the
similar arguments.
More generalizations could be achieved along this line. In Radner and Rosenthal
(1982), independent payoff-relevant and strategy-relevant private information is
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considered. Fu et al. (2007) introduced a new concept of strategy-relevant public
information, and Fu (2008) extended the space of public information to be count-
able and the set of common information to be a general probability space. In all
of these papers, the purification results and existence of pure strategy equilibria
are restricted in the case of finite actions. By appropriately adopting the relative
diffuseness assumption and appealing to analogous arguments, our results can be
naturally extended to their settings with general action spaces.
7 Appendix
Let (T,T , λ) be a probability space and X a topological space with the Borel
σ-algebra B(X). A correspondence from T to X is a mapping F from T to the
family of nonempty subsets of X. A correspondence F is said to be T -measurable
if its graph belongs to the product σ-algebra T ⊗ B(X). A mapping f : T → X
is called a selection of F if f(t) ∈ F (t) for λ-almost all t ∈ T ; f is said to be a
T -measurable selection if it is T -measurable. The distribution of F is defined as
follows:
DTF = {λf
−1 | f is a T -measurable selection of F}.
A correspondence F from T to X is said to be upper-hemicontinuous at t0 ∈ T
if for any open set U ⊆ X that contains F (t0), there exists a neighborhood V of t0
such that for every t ∈ V , F (t) ∈ U . A correspondence is upper-hemicontinuous
if it is upper-hemicontinuous at every point t ∈ T . Furthermore, let M(X) de-
note the space of Borel probability measures on X with the topology of weak
convergence.
The following lemma is proved by He and Sun (2013), which is a preparation
for the proof of the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in games with incomplete
information.
Lemma 2. Suppose that (T,T , λ) is an atomless probability space and T is nowhere
equivalent to its countably generated sub-σ-algebra F . Then we have the following
statements.
A1. For any compact-valued F-measurable correspondence F from T to X, DTF
is compact and convex.16
A2. Let F be a compact-valued F-measurable correspondence from (T,F , λ) to X,
16To obtain the convexicity of DT
F
, it suffices to assume that F is closed-valued.
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Y a metric space, and G a closed-valued correspondence from T × Y → X
such that
(a) for every (t, y) ∈ T × Y , G(t, y) ⊆ F (t);
(b) for every y ∈ Y , G(·, y) is F-measurable;
(c) for every t ∈ T , G(t, ·) is upper-hemicontinuous;
Then H(y) = DTGy is upper-hemicontinuous.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. To consider pure-strategy equilibria, we focus on the interim
payoff function. For each i ∈ I, the interim payoff function Fi from Ti × Ai ×(
×nj=1M(Aj)
)
to R is defined as follows:
Fi(ti, ai, τ1, . . . , τn) =
∫
A−i
ui(ai, a−i, ti) dτ−i(a−i).
It is clear that Fi is continuous on Ai ×
(
×nj=1M(Aj)
)
and Fi-measurable on Ti.
For each i ∈ I, the best response correspondence Gi from Ti ×
(
×nj=1M(Aj)
)
to
Ai is given by
Gi(ti, τi, . . . , τn) = argmax
ai∈Ai
Fi(ti, ai, τi, . . . , τn).
For each ti, Berge’s maximal theorem implies thatGi is nonempty, compact-valued,
and upper-hemicontinuous on ×nj=1M(Aj).
For any (τi, . . . , τn), Fi is continuous on Ai and Fi-measurable on Ti. Then
Lemma III.14 (page 70) and Lemma III.39 (Application, page 86) of Castaing and Valadier
(1977) asserts that Fi is Fi ⊗ B(Ai)-measurable and Gi admits an Fi-measurable
selection. ThusDTi
Gi(·,τ1,...,τn)
is not empty. Moreover, it is convex, compact-valued,
and upper-hemicontinuous on ×nj=1M(Aj) by Lemma 2.
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Consider a correspondence ψ from ×nj=1M(Aj) to itself:
ψ(τ1, . . . , τn) = ×
n
i=1D
Ti
Gi(·,τ1,...,τn)
.
Then it is clear that ψ is nonempty, convex, compact-valued, and upper-hemicontinuous
on ×ni=1M(Aj). By Fan-Glicksberg’s fixed-point theorem, there exists a fixed point
17Note that Gi(ti, τ1, . . . , τn) ⊆ Hi(ti), where Hi is a correspondence from Ti to Ai such that Hi(ti) ≡
Ai for all ti.
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(τ∗1 , . . . , τ
∗
n) of ψ. Thus for each i, there exists some f
∗
i ∈ L
Ti
0 (Ti, Ai) such that f
∗
i
is a selection of Gi(·, τ
∗
1 , . . . , τ
∗
n) and τ
∗
i is induced by f
∗
i .
So the payoff of player i is
Ui(f
∗) =
∫
T
ui(f
∗
i (ti), f
∗
−i(t−i), ti) dλ
=
∫
Ti
∫
T−i
ui(f
∗
i (ti), f
∗
−i(t−i), ti) dλ−i dλi
=
∫
Ti
∫
A−i
ui(f
∗
i (ti), a−i, ti) dτ
∗
−i dλi.
The first equality holds due to the definition of Ui, second equality holds based
on Assumption (I), and the third equality relies on change of variables. By the
choice of τ∗, we have that (f∗1 , f
∗
2 . . . , f
∗
n) is a pure-strategy equilibrium.
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